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Enlightening the Religion Clauses
Suzanna Sherry*
"The US. Constitution ... is a godless document."'
"Constitutionalism ... assumes that the passions of men will 2not

conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint."
INTRODUCTION

Any interpretation of the religion clauses confronts at the outset the
problem that the two clauses are in apparent tension.' Whether as a result
of underlying philosophy or as a result of changed circumstances and
subsequent interpretation, the Establishment Clause seems to reflect a
preference for the secular and the Free Exercise Clause a preference for
the religious." The tension mirrors a pervasive ambiguity in American
thought: "On the one hand, Americans, although not dominated by any
particular form of organized religion, have viewed their democratic
traditions as intimately related to their general religious traditions.... At
the same time, a second powerful conviction exists that, pursuant to
constitutional command, government should be secular."5
* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of Minnesota. I
would like to thank Paul Edelman, Dan Farber, and Mike Paulsen for their comments on earlier drafts
of this article, and Kaitlin Hallett for her research assistance. The usual caveats apply; Mike in particular
disagrees with almost every word in the article.
I. ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST
RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 27 (1996).
2. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 274

(1995).
3. The Religion Clauses do not present the only internal tension in the Constitution. Bob Nagel has
suggested that there is an inevitable tension inherent in the constitutional grant of power to Congress:
although the enumeration of specific powers implies limits, the breadth of the powers enumerated (to
say nothing of the necessary and proper clause) seems to transcend those limits. Robert F. Nagel. The
Future of Federalism, CASE W. RES. L. REV. _
(forthcoming 1996).
4. As many scholars have noted, "neutrality" is a problematic concept in this context, even if it was
the original intent of the framers. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992
SUP. CT. REV. 123, 135-46; Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions. and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 315 (1987); William P.
Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHt. L. REV. 308, 319 (1991)
("Free Exercise Revisionism"); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled
Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989-1990) ("The Case Against Exemption");
Douglas Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1415-16 (1981); see also
Michael W. McConnell, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Where is the Supreme Court

Heading? 32 CATH. LAW. 187, 197-98 (1989) (Court must either retreat from its Free Exercise
jurisprudence or from its Establishment jurisprudence).
5.

Diane L. Zimmerman, To Walk a Crooked Path: Separating Law and Religion in the Secular

State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1095, 1095-96 (1986). For other statements recognizing the tension,
see. e.g.. Sherry, supra note 4; John H. Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981
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The tension is most acutely felt in cases raising the question of whether
to accord special treatment---either positive or negative--4o religion and
religious believers. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that this problem
is the question under the religion clauses.6 The older version of this
problem is how to treat those with religious objections to general laws.
The reasoning of the Court's Establishment Clause precedents, beginning
with Lemon v. Kurtzman,' suggests that to accord special treatment to
religious objections would be to privilege religious beliefs over secular
beliefs, violating the Establishment Clause." But a long line of Free
Exercise cases simultaneously required just such an accommodation of
religious beliefs.9 Thus the Establishment Clause seems to demand that
the government not favor religious beliefs over other beliefs, but the Free
Exercise Clause demands that the government not disadvantage religious
believers, even unintentionally; thus sometimes it must grant special
privileges to religious believers to relieve the burdens it has unintentionally placed on them.
The core values of the two clauses seem well reflected in these two
lines of cases, even if we would quibble with the Court's specific
applications. We can probably all agree that the Establishment Clause is
designed to prevent the government from putting its imprimatur behind
any one religion or religion in general,'" while the Free Exercise Clause
is designed to protect religion from government interference. The problem,
of course, lies in translating these broad principles into constitutional
doctrine. There are four possible pairs of "pure" interpretations of the
two clauses: (1) we might interpret both clauses broadly; (2) we might

Sup. CT. REV. 193, 213-14, 218; Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701,
709-10 (1986); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1991) (modern secularist interpretation of Establishment Clause deprives Free
Exercise Clause of its original, and only sufficient, rationale).
6. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. I, 6 ("Virtually every
controversy under the Religion Clauses can be understood as raising the question of the special status
of religion"): Marshall, supra note 4, at 358 ("The jurisprudence of free exercise, in short, is the
jurisprudence of constitutionally compelled exemption"); but see Laycock, supra note 4, at 1374, 138990 (not all religion clause questions exhibit tension). I have suggested elsewhere that this tension can
only be resolved by elevating one clause above the other when they conflict. SHERRY, supra note 4.
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

8. See, e.g., Estate of Thomton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. I (1989).

9. See. e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Vemner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136 (1987).
10. "Imprimatur" is a more appropriate description than either "coercion" or "financial suppon."-adopted by some scholars--because otherwise it would be perfectly acceptable for the Congress
to establish a "Church of the United States" as long as it neither used any tax money nor insisted on
attendance or affiliation. See Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False
Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 39 (1991).

II.

There are also what might be called "diluted" or intermediate approaches that blend two or more

of the core interpretation pairs. These approaches raise the same problems as their parent pairs. and add
unpredictability.

[Vol. 7:473

HeinOnline -- 7 J. Contem. Legal Issues 474 1996

Religion Clauses

interpret both clauses narrowly; (3) we might prefer the Free Exercise
Clause in cases of conflict; and (4) we might prefer the Establishment
Clause in cases of conflict. I have argued elsewhere that (1) is impossible
in a society as pervasively regulated as the modem United States, and that
(2) is dangerous because it leaves the legislature too much discretion to
favor or disfavor particular religions. 2 This article addresses the remaining choices: in cases of conflict, should we prefer the core principles of
the Establishment Clause or of the Free Exercise Clause?
The constitutional dilemma of religion, moreover, goes much deeper
than simply a conflict between the two religion clauses. Last term's
decision in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of

irginia13 was a new twist on an old problem. There the conflict was not
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, but
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause. The Court
was forced to choose between allowing the University to disadvantage
religious speakers relative to other speakers, or allowing the University to
spend its students' money on religious proselytizing. The former
alternative seems plainly inconsistent with the Free Speech Clause, the
latter with the Establishment Clause. Similar disputes are arising at other
state universities. The University of Minnesota, for example, recently
settled a dispute over whether Christian student groups can receive
University funding if they require their voting members to subscribe to a
religious "Statement of Faith." The University requires all funded student
organizations to eschew discrimination on various grounds, including
religion, and thus refused to fund these groups. The Christian student
groups claimed that the University's refusal to fund them violated their
free speech and association rights under such cases as Widmar v.
Vincent

4

and Roberts v. United States Jaycees. 5

One way to look at the Court's decision in Rosenberger is to suggest

that it and Employment Division v. Smith'6 together adopt an approach

of formal neutrality: the government is prohibited only from intentionally
advantaging or disadvantaging religious believers. Under this scheme,
there is no free exercise violation if the government requires religious
objectors to obey the same laws as everybody else; nor is there an
establishment violation if the government funds religious speakers the
same way it funds other speakers. Justice Scalia, perhaps the most
prominent contemporary formalist, may perhaps have viewed the cases that

12. See SHERRY, supra note 4.
13. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
14. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
15. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). For an account of the controversy and a defense of the students'
position--to which the University ultimately acceded--see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on "Equal Access"
for Religious Speakers and Groups (unpublished manuscript).
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

1996]
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way, as he was in the majority in both cases. Formal neutrality of this sort,
however, is especially unpopular among scholars of religion. 7 Additionally, the kind of formal neutrality implied by Rosenberger allows the
government to fund religion directly since it funds similar charitable or
which seems to deprive the Establishment
educational enterprises,

Clause of its core prohibition on requiring taxpayers to support religion.
Other than a few unrepentant formalists, moreover, there is little overlap
between those who agree with Rosenbergerand those who applaud Smith.
Justice Stevens, for example, joined the majority in Smith and the dissent
in Rosenberger. Justice O'Connor, who joined the majority in
Rosenberger, concurred only in the judgment in Smith, specifically
declining to adopt the majority's position of formal neutrality. Most
scholars (including myself) applaud one of the cases while lamenting the
other. Michael McConnell, for example, bitterly condemned the decision
in Smith 9 but argued the case for the winning plaintiffs in Rosenberger.
Defining neutrality thus does not resolve the debate about the meaning of
the religion clauses.
Instead, we must resolve the tension at a deeper level, that of conflict
between religious and secular authorities generally. As the current debates
in the literature about the extent to which religious reasons constitute
legitimate justifications for public policy2" indicate, this is, in fact, an
epistemological conflict between faith and reason. The problem arises

17. See. e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal. Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants ofFree Exercise, 1990 SUP.
CT. REV. I; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and The
Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 311 (1986).
18. For an extended discussion of how neutrality might be defined to permit government funding
of religion. see Ira C. Lupu. Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 588-89, 594-95 (1991). The Supreme Court went
out of its way to avoid this implication of Rosenberger, struggling mightily to explain why a state
university's use of student monies was not the same as governmental use of tax revenues. 115 S. Ct.
at 2522.
19. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1109 (1990).
20. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); KENT
GREENAWALT. RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY. LOVE AND
POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); Robert Audi, The
Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259 (1989)
Franklin 1.Gamwell, Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2 J. LAW & RELIG. 325 (1984); Edward
B. Foley, Tillich and Camus. Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 954 (1992); Kent Greenawalt,
Religious Convictions and Lawmaking. 84 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1985); Abner S. Greene, The Political
Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993); Kathleen M. Sullivan. Religion and
Liberal Democracy. 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in
the Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993); David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and
Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Response to ProfessorPerry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067
(1991); Steven D. Smith, Separationand the "Secular"':Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision,
67 TEX. L. REV. 955 (1989); Smith. supra note 5; Anthony J. Bevilacqua, Symposium: Politics.
Religion, and the Relationship Between Church and State, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 989 (1990); Foreword:
The Role of Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Society. 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 643 (1993).

[Vol. 7:473
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because the secular state--at least in our constitutional democracy--grounds its authority on notions of individual choice mediated by
human reason, while religion often depends instead on "the irresistible
conviction of the authority of God."'21 Thus, because "[r]eligious belief
need not be founded in reason, guided by reason, or governed in any way
by the reasonable,"22 it can place demands on believers that are unjustifiable under the epistemology of the secular state. The claim that the
Establishment Clause should be subordinated when it conflicts with the
religious or speech rights of believers is really a claim that the import of
the religion clauses is that the government must remain neutral not only
on the potential truth of religious claims but also on their epistemology.
It is a claim that the government should not be permitted to privilege
reason over faith as a method of obtaining and verifying truth claims.
Thus, any satisfactory interpretation of the religion clauses must come to
terms with the inevitable conflict between faith and reason.
The gulf between those who would rely on faith and those who would
rely on reason is illustrated by quotations from partisans on each side:
"The bar against an establishment of religion entails the establishment of
a civil order-the culture of liberal democracy-for resolving public moral
disputes., '2 3 "[N]either you nor I, nor society, nor the state, nor this
democracy, can bear to live without God.... How long will it take us to
learn this truth? The time has come to restore the vital relationship
between the church and state, between religion and law."2
I will argue in this article that our Constitution does--as a matter of
history-and ought to-as a matter of policy-privilege reason over faith.
This is not to say that religious freedom should be abandoned or that
religious belief should be discouraged. Stephen Macedo has suggested that
in resolving other constitutional dilemmas, we should envision the
Constitution as islands of governmental powers "surrounded by a sea of
rights," rather than as "islands [of rights] surrounded by a sea of
governmental powers., 25 Similarly, I would approach interpretation of the
religion clauses as preliminarily a question of orientation: should we
presume that the constitutional protection of religion-found primarily in
the Free Exercise Clause-is a limited aberration in a secular state, and
thus best interpreted narrowly, or should we assume contrarily that the
aberration is the confinement of religion to the private sphere, and thus
instead interpret the Establishment Clause narrowly? To answer this

21. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 172
(1992).
22. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1256 (1994).
23. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 198.
24. Anthony J. Bevilacqua, Foreword: Church and State-Partners in Freedom, 39 DEPAUL L. REV.

989, 991 (1990).
25.

STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 32 (1986).
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question, I will first try to define the major distinctions between faith and
reason, and then to defend the primacy of reason using both historical and
practical arguments. Finally, I will suggest what effect a preference for
reason might have on constitutional doctrine.
I.

OF FAITH AND REASON

Reason and religion are both notoriously difficult to define. I make no
claim here to have solved the conundrum, but seek only to sketch broad
epistemological differences and to note how contemporary legal scholars
who have rejected the distinction have erred. I should note first that
although religion and faith are not entirely interchangeable, they are
closely related, especially in the United States. While it might be possible
to envision a religion based wholly or partly on reason, most of the major
religions in America are based on faith as the underlying epistemology.
This is especially true of the types of claims that engender litigation. '
The most basic tenets of each religion tend to be supported primarily by
faith rather than reason, and indeed few religious claims could be justified
by observation and rational argument. Moreover, to the extent that a
religiously-motivated conclusion is also supportable by rational argument,
it should not pose a problem in a secular state; it is only nonrational
arguments that threaten the primacy of reason. There is thus a difference
between religious motivations--which may cause us to believe or feel
strongly about particular conclusions that are also rationally justifiable---and an epistemology of faith, in which nonrational beliefs are
permitted to trump ordinary rationality. It is only the latter that presents
a conflict with reason. Since the vast majority of American religious
beliefs--and, in particular, the religious beliefs that engender constitutional
litigation-fall into this latter category, I will sometimes equate religion
with faith, opposing both to reason.
The crucial difference between faith and reason lies in both the source
of truth and in what counts as valid evidence of it. These two aspects of
truth, of course, are interrelated. For the faithful, the ultimate authority and
source of truth is extrahuman, and evidence can--and in some religious
traditions, must-be entirely personal to the individual; for the reasonable,
both the source and the evidence for the truth lie in common human
observation, experience, and reasoning. To have faith is to affirm a
transcendent reality, different from that observed by nonbelievers.

26. I have in mind such beliefs as creationism, see. e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987),
faith healing; Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
814, 828 (1996), and the variety of commands purportedly imposed by God, Sherbert v. Vemer, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).

[Vol. 7:473
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There are three interrelated differences between an epistemology of
reason and one of faith. They all rest, in some sense, on the difference
between a commonly shared perception of reality and a perception of
reality accessible only to the faithful. First, the source of faith-at least in
most religions in the United States--is extrahuman and thus accessible
only to those who already believe or who convert. As Abner Greene puts
it:
Another way of putting this is that religion self-consciously revels in the
unsensible, whereas science and other sources from which people make
arguments at least purport to rely solely on the observable, on what we
share as humans. So even if science (both natural and social) is
based-as religion is-in an important way on faith (nondeducible
premises), the critical difference is that by its own terms, science points
to the human and natural world for the source of value, whereas
religion, by its own terms, points not only to the human and natural
world, but also outward to an extrahuman realm.27
To the extent that religion is based on an epistemology of faith (as are the
major religions in the United States), any argument grounded solely on
religious beliefs can ultimately be reduced to a claim about what God
requires. Although some of these arguments can take rational form--such
as disputes about the correct interpretation of sacred texts, about
appropriate human goals or behavior, about whether particular obligations
exist--they are nevertheless disputes about how we should determine what
God commands.2" The source of rational belief, by contrast, is shared
human observation, experience, and capacity for reason.
Positing an extra-human source of ultimate authority has two consequences. It affects both one's attitude toward that authority and one's
ability to validate one's beliefs. Secular science and liberal politics, both
committed to the primacy of reason, necessarily deny that any truth is
incontestable. While some beliefs may be given a presumption of
correctness, all beliefs are ultimately subject to the critique of reason.
Faith, on the other hand, demands fidelity. It is, as Michael McConnell
points out, a belief in "the irresistible conviction of the authority of

27. Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 535,
540. See also David R. Dow, On Reading Stephen Carter's The Culture of Disbelief-A Dissenting
Opinion, I I J. LAW & RELIG. 417, 435-36 (1994-1995).
28. Bill Marshall is thus mistaken when he states that some religious principles derive from reason
rather than faith, William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 846-47
(1993). and that "[religion can [be], and often is. susceptible to reasoned and dispassionate discussion,"
William P. Marshall, The Inequality of Anti-establishment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 66. While reason

may inform how the principles are apprehended, the principles themselves are presumably derived from
God.

1996]
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God." 29 As another scholar puts it: "Religious principles ...

are the
words of God. Man lacks the power to modify them."3 To question
God's authority is to waver in one's faith."
Finally, because the source of beliefs inspired by faith is extra-human,

the validity of those beliefs is not testable by ordinary rational means. The
methods of science and rational argument are of no avail in evaluating
claims based on faith: "The process by which one develops belief in a
transcendent reality-acquires faith-is not, cannot be, a rational process,
for the validity of the objects of one's faith cannot be observed or tested,

nor can it be logically proven. '

32

Nor can faith be rationally disproven,

for while "incoherence, anomaly, and paradox always count as weaknesses
in a scientific theom ... this appears not to be the case for ... traditional

religious thought."' 3 Thus, unlike replicable scientific truths and rational
arguments based on human observation and experience, both the source

and the validity of religious beliefs based on faith are uniquely personal,
not shared except within the community of believers. As Kent Greenawalt
puts it: "The truths that one person learns by making a leap of faith are
not fully accessible to someone who has not made a similar leap, and
generally accessible reasons are not powerful enough to induce a leap of
faith. 34

Larry Alexander and Bill Marshall, among others, reject this distinction,
suggesting that there is no "epistemological divide" between reason and

29. MCCONNELL, supra note 21, at 172; see also MCCONNELL, supra note 6, at 15 ("Ifthere is a
God, His authority necessarily transcends the authority of nations; that, in part, is what we mean by
'God'); William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 243, 252 (1994)
(surveying literature).
30. DOw. supra note 27, at 434. Dow notes that unlike religious values, "legal and moral values
are fluid; they are subject to discussion and hence ready alteration." Id. at 433.
31. For other descriptions of this difference between religion and reason, see, e.g., Christopher
Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. L. REV. 347, 369
(1995) ("blasphemy is inconsistent with the [rationalist] American constitutional order, but the
possibility of blasphemy is constitutive of many religious orders"); Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion
and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 530, Lonnie D. Kliever, Academic Freedom
and Church-Affiliated Universities, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1477 (1988); FOLEY, supra note 20, at 959-60; see
also MARSHALL, supra note 28, at 852 (although there is no epistemological difference between reason
and religion, the human needs that religion serves make it inevitable that religion will be "dogmatic and
authoritarian").
32. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts
on Religion and Law in Modem America, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1579, 1604 (1987).
33. JEFFREY STOUT, THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE QUEST FOR
AUTONOMY 105 (1981). See also id. at 106.
What we might deem a 'paradox,' and therefore a weakness, traditional theology christens a
'mystery,' to be accepted on faith. So even ifa given doctrine turns out to be a logical paradox,
such that its intelligibility or comprehensibility must be taken on faith, a traditional theologian
would not treat this as a potential obstacle to belief.
34. Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for Political Judgment: The Status of Personal Experience and the
Autonomy and Generality of Principles of Restraint. 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 647, 649 (1993) (describing
but not endorsing this view of religion).

[Vol. 7:473
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faith.35 They argue that secular truths are no more provable than religious
truths by purely rational or empirical means. 36 Even if this is true--and
I will argue in a moment that its truth is so constrained that it cannot bear
the weight Alexander puts on it-it is of limited significance. The crucial
epistemological difference between reason and faith is aspirational:
religion's goal is to identify and follow the word of God while secularists
attempt to appeal only to shared human knowledge. Even if it fails, then,
the goal of reason is epistemologically different from the goal of
religion."
Moreover, in arguing that reason cannot support secular truths any more
than it can support religious truths, these scholars adopt an overly cramped
view of reason. Reason need not be either sterile or abstract. Owen Fiss
has described what he calls substantive rationality, which is "an intellectual process in which we deliberate about ends, about what is just or fair or
equal."3 Others have described a similar process as pragmatism or
practical reason. 39 Pragmatist moral reasoning need not be foundationalist

or purely inductive: it can draw on common experience and observation
and it can tolerate some amount of uncertainty. Nevertheless, moral
reasoning, like legal reasoning, can be good or bad. It can contain
inconsistencies and failures to notice logically necessary connections.40

35. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 763, 774 (1993); MARSHALL, supra note 28, al 845-47; see also Robert Audi, Rationality and
Religious Commitment, in FAITH, REASON AND SKEPTICISM 50 (Marcus Hester ed., 1992);
GREENAWALT, supra note 20; Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case ofEpistemic Abstinence, 16 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 3, 39-43 (1990); Tom Stacy, Reconciling Reason and Religion: On Dworkin and Religious
Freedom, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I, 55-56 (1994). For contrary views, see, e.g., GEDICKS & HENDRIX,
supra note 32; Mark Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33 LOYOLA L.
REV. 221, 240 (1987); Greene, supra note 20; STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZES RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 43 (1993).
36. See ALEXANDER. supra note 35, at 774-75 ("the propositions of liberalism are not empirical.
but metaphysical and normative," and "Em]oral reasoning rests either on nonempirical premises or on
inferences that are not matters of logical entailment"); MARSHALL. supra note 28. at 846-47; Scott
Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation: A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory of the Religion Clauses,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 348 ("it is far from apparent that secular first principles ... are in fact any
more provable or accessible than religious first principles"); see also SMITH, supra note 20, at 1008
(while citizenry might agree on facts and reasoning methods, "political decisions are inevitably
grounded in evaluative judgments, and in that realm, universal (or anything close to universal)
agreement is much more elusive").
37. See EISGRUBER. supra note 31, al 369-70.
38. Owen M. Fiss, Responses, 5 YALE 1. CRITICISM 213, 216 (1992); see also Owen M. Fiss,
Reason In All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789 (1990); Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?
Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52
U. Pirr. L. REV. 75, 175 (1990).
39. See generally, PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds.,
1991); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS
(1988); Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995
U. ILL. L. REV. 163; Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989).
Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
40. For an elaboration of how moral reasoning can fail, see JUDITH JARVIS THOMPSON, THE REALM
OF RIGHTS 24-29 (1990). See also DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 32 (1984) ("Moral
positions can be discredited if they are internally inconsistent").
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It can fit-poorly with experience or with one's other beliefs, or have
unpalatable implications. 4' It can be based on faulty premises, unchallenged only because of cognitive negligence.42 Reason is, moreover,
publicly accessible: anyone can participate in a debate about whether
particular reasoning is flawed.43
An epistemology of faith has no such limitations or qualifications. To
have faith is to be able to ignore contradictions, contrary evidence, and
logical implications. Indeed, one test of faith is its capacity to resist the
blandishments of rationality: the stronger the rational arguments against a
belief, the more faith is needed to adhere to it. Nor is it possible for those
without faith to enter the discussion. Thus, although reason need not
produce either certainty or unanimous agreement, it has features that
differentiate it from faith, and make its truths more appropriate for public
use. I now turn to the central question of the religion clauses: where faith
and reason conflict, which should prevail?
II.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The battle over the original intent of the religion clauses has been
fought to a draw. There have been many interesting diversions along the
way: Jefferson, whom historians consider the epitome of early American
M has been castigated as a liberal; 41 Madison, who
civic republicanism,"
practically invented the American idea of the liberal science of politics
(pace Sunstein), has been lumped with evangelicals.4 6 Nevertheless, we
seem to have reached a point where, as Mark Tushnet has pointed out,
"the better the history we have, the less helpful that history is in resolving
problems of constitutional interpretation." Now what?
I would suggest that in looking for the historical meaning of the religion
clauses we have been looking in the wrong place. Trying to divine the

41. Coherence with other beliefs is part of the pragmatist vision of reason. See. e.g., LYONS, supra
note 40, at 35; Charles Larmore, Beyond Religion and Enlightenment, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 799, 81213 (1993). Note that both coherence and adequate reasoning process are necessary for us to deem a
belief rational. See Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273 (1992).
42. See RAz, supra note 41, at 279-80 (1992) (in addition to coherence, "we also can expect that
a person should not be rash, or gullible, or prejudiced, or superstitious").
43. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (suggestion that only publicly
accessible reasons should underlie public policy formation).
44. See. e.g., LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY
(1978).
45. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1443, 1449-50 (1990).
46. MCCONNELL, supra note 45, at 1452-55.
47. Mark V. Tushnet, The Origins of the Establishment Clause, 75 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1511 (1987);
see also Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 839, 841 (1986) ("we cannot definitively read the minds of the Founders except, usually, to
create a choice of several possible meaning for the necessarily recondite language that appears in much
of our charter of government").
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original intent of specific clauses is inevitably doomed to failure, as the
controversy over the original meaning of the religion clauses illustrates.
Indeed, the problems that beset originalism in general are especially
troubling in the context of the religion clauses. Two of the strongest
advocates of a broad Free Exercise Clause admit that the founding
generation was concerned about a substantially different threat to religious
freedom than the one that most concerns religious believers today. Michael
McConnell puts it this way: for the founders, "the great threat to religious
pluralism [was] a triumphalist majority religion," but "[t]he more serious
threat to religious pluralism today is a combination of indifference to the
plight of religious minorities and a preference for the secular in public
affairs."18 Or, as Douglas Laycock describes it, "[t]he nature of conflict
over religious liberty has changed" from inter-sect violence and discrimination to conflicts between the secular and the religious.49 It is difficult
to see how the founders' resolution of the one problem--how to resolve
inter-sect conflict--gives us any guidance on their resolution of the
other--how to resolve the conflicts between the secular and the religious.
But if the dilemma of the religion clauses is viewed as primarily a
conflict between faith and reason, history can offer more guidance. It is
historically uncontroversial that the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on
rationalism and empiricism and its rejection of religious faith and
mysticism, was the primary epistemology of the founding generation. Most
scholars consider the Constitution itself to be a product of the Enlightenment. o Unlike founding documents of the previous century, the
Constitution does not refer to God5" or to any religious purpose. Indeed,
48. MCCONNELL, supra note 21, at 169.
49. Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 883. 883-85 (1994).
50. See. e.g.. HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF REASON: How EUROPE IMAGINED AND
AMERICA REALIZED THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1977); RALPH KETCHAM. FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE
ENDURING PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1993); HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN
AMERICA (1976); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. 1776-1787 (1969);
Andrew J. Reck. The Enlightenment in American Law I: The Constitution. 44 REV. OF METAPHYSICS
729 (1991).
5I. See. e.g.. 1632 Charter of Maryland, in 3 FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS. COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES. TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1677 (1909) (granting
charter "by the Grace of God" to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore, who is "animated with a
laudable, and pious Zeal for extending the Christian Religion" over lands "partly occupied by Savages,
having no knowledge of the Divine Being"); 1620 Agreement Between the Settlers at New Plymouth.
in 3 THORPE at 1841 (begins "In the Name of God, Amen" and notes that the signatories covenant "in
the Presence of God and one another"); 1635 Act of Surrender of the Great Charter of New England
to His Majesty, in 3 THORPE at 1860 (addressed to "all Christian People" and sending "Greeting, in our
Lord God everlasting"); 1621 Ordinances for Virginia, in 7 THORPE at 3810 (invoking "Divine
Assistance").
52. For this lack, it was roundly criticized at the time of its adoption. See KRAMNICK & MOORE,
supra note I, at 26-45.
Actually, there is a single reference to "our Lord," but its context supports rather than refutes the

Constitution's primarily secular nature. Between Article VII and the signatures of the delegates, is the
following:
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as one scholar has noted, the Constitution itself informs us that "it is
Liberty's Blessings, not God's, that we are trying to secure 'to ourselves
and our Posterity."' 3 The underlying epistemology of the Constitution,
then, is reason rather than faith. This is not to suggest that the founding
generation was necessarily irreligious-although they were, according to
one scholar, "a distinctly unchurched
people" 4-- but simply that they
s
government.5
secular
a
created
This conclusion, moreover, is in accord with the way we ordinarily view
legal and constitutional doctrine. A few examples should suffice. In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,6 the Court recently
examined at length what constitutes "knowledge" for purposes of expert
testimony. The Court stated that "'knowledge' connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation," although it need not mean
certainty."' The Court also distinguished "scientific knowledge" from
"absurd and irrational pseudo-scientific assertions." ' s Although the
Daubert Court was concerned specifically with scientific knowledge, it
seems uncontroversial that no court would permit, for example, a
conviction based on the testimony of an astrologer who contended that the
defendant's astrological chart demonstrated that he was guilty, or a
medium who claimed that the dead victim named the murderer. Similarly,
the test of rationality used by the Court in judging the constitutionality of
any law that is not subject to heightened scrutiny would reject a law
purportedly justified by astrology, or by the legislators' unsupported
"faith" that, for example, blue cars were more dangerous than green cars
and thus should be banned.
Our legal culture and constitutional history, then, seem to privilege
rationality. Unless the religion clauses have a different source or
Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of

September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the
Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth In Witness whereof We have
hereunto subscribed our Names.
The juxtaposition of the two ways of describing the date suggests that the delegates might have used
the conventional phrase "the Year of our Lord" merely as a way of differentiating that date from the
second, more significant description. Certainly the delegates did not seem to find the reference

significant. Madison described Benjamin Franklin's original proposal for this language: "Done in
Convention by the unanimous consent of the States present the 17th of Sepr &c-In Witness whereof
we have hereunto subscribed our names." JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL

CONVENTION OF 1787 654 (Monday, September 17) (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) ("Madison's Notes").
There was no further discussion of this language.
53.

LUPU, supra note 18, at 596.

54.

KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note I, at 17.

55. And they did so "despite their enormous respect for religion, their faith in divinely endowed
human rights, and their belief that democracy benefited from a moral citizenry who believed in God."
KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note I, at 12.

56.

113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).

57. Id. at 2795.
58. Id at 2798. Cf HOLMES. supra note 2, at 231 (1995) ("By the Enlightenment standards on
which our constitutional settlement was based, a community's attempt to compel scientific outcomes
congenial to its nonrational attachments should probably be described as a form of self-injury").
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motivation, they too should be interpreted from an Enlightenment
perspective. Certainly, a polity based on rationalist Enlightenment
principles might have many reasons to protect religious freedom. Religious
liberty might be seen as a natural right, or as a mere manifestation of a
broader preference for liberty and against government interference with
private choices. Religious beliefs and organizations may be conducive to
producing responsible citizenry. Religious freedom may be necessary to
avoid turmoil and keep the peace. Especially if religious belief is deeplyheld, nonrational, and somewhat idiosyncratic,
the alternative to
protecting religious liberty is a perpetually angry and resentful
subpopulation of citizens. Thus protecting religious liberty-and, in
particular, prohibiting government discrimination based on religion--may
reduce religious strife and promote the welfare of both individuals and the
community. There is some evidence that all these factors may have
influenced the founding generation.' None of these motivations undermine the conclusion that the religion clauses, like the rest of the Constitution, rest on a primarily rationalist and secular philosophy as opposed to
one of faith, and should thus be interpreted as a historical matter to
privilege--or at least to permit the legislature to privilege-reason over
faith.
Michael McConnell, however, has argued that rational secularists were
not the only players on the constitutional stage in the eighteenth century.
He suggests that religious evangelists, whose agenda did not include
reliance on reason, were a major force behind the religion clauses.6
Other scholars have vigorously disputed the implications of his historical
analysis. 62 As Mark Tushnet comments, "[a]s a historian, McConnell is

59. See John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values ofReligious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779.
796 (1986); Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 841, 842 (1992).
60. See. e.g., Laura Underkuffmer-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 910-18 (1995)
(surveying literature on founding generation's "belief ... that religiously-based 'virtue' was necessary
for the success of the republican experiment"); Mark Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1515 ("Miller, Levy,
and Curry demonstrate that the framers' generation regarded religion as an essential precondition of
social order and a crucial prop for the novel sort of government they were creating"); WALTER BERNS,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 9-10, 27-30 (1976) (avoiding
religious strife). SMITH, supra note 5. at 164 (libertarian arguments).
61. MCCONNELL, supra note 45.
62. See. e.g.. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note I; Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of
Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Ellis M. West,
The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of Conscientious Objectors to
Conscription, 10 J. LAW & RELIG. 367 (1993-94); GEY, supra note 38; MARSHALL, supra note 4. As
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager note: "McConnell believes that '[n]o other figure played so
large a role in the enactment of the Religion Clauses as Jefferson and Madison.' We might reasonably
conclude that the serious divergence between the views of these two pivotal thinkers renders history an
unreliable guide to interpretation of the Religion Clauses." EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 22, at
1272-73 (1994).
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a fine lawyer. '63 Even McConnell himself admits that the evidence is
equivocal.64 Certainly, McConnell's religiously sympathetic Madison 65
is a controversial portrait of the man who could write that "accidental
differences in political, religious, or other opinions" appear "erroneous or
ridiculous"
to the "enlightened Statesman, or the benevolent philoso6
pher.1
McConnell's conclusion that nonrational religious evangelists influenced
Madison to include broad substantive protections for religious freedom in
his bill of rights is also inconsistent with Madison's general political
philosophy. The cornerstone of Madison's political scheme was constructing a way to avoid the devastating effect that factions could have on a
democracy. The evangelists described by McConnell are, of course, just
such a faction; indeed, in both the Philadelphia convention and Federalist
10 Madison pointed to religious differences as one cause of factionalism." Moreover, the tradition from which Madison drew his concern
about factions recognized that factions were primarily the result of
irrational impulses getting the better of human rationality." To suggest
that Madison's bill of rights was the product of a religious faction that

63. Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 117. 127; see
also id. at 124: "McConnell's article employs the best sort of 'law office history,' a rhetorical form
designed to give historical evidence favorable to an advocate's position the most weight it can bear,
while at the same time explaining away apparently unfavorable evidence .... (McConnell) regularly
construes ambiguous evidence in favor of his interpretation, when it could just as easily be construed
against it." Cf Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theorv: A Response to

Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995) (attack on McConnell's skills as a historian in
context of a different article).
64. MCCONNELL, supra note 19, at 1117; Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation
Restoring the Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181,

185 (1992). Moreover, the Evangelical movement was more complex---and probably less wholeheartedly
committed to the primacy of faith over reason--than McConnell suggests. See JAMES TURNER,
WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN AMERICA 77-79 (1985):

There was no escaping the fact, however much tactful words disguised it,
that the God of
Abraham and Isaac, of Augustine and Aquinas, of Luther and Calvin could hardly any more
command credence from an alert twelve-year-old. Well before 1790, the idea had fully formed
that God acted in two distinct modes. Although His spiritual governance remained immediate,
personal, and except in broad principles unpredictable. He managed His visible world through
impersonal natural laws .... Evangelicals, in common with virtually all educated Americans,
accepted the divided God of the Enlightenment.
65.

66.

MCCONNELL, supra note 45, at 1452-55.
LETTER FROM JAMES MADISON TO THOMAS JEFFERSON (OCTOBER 24, 1787), reprinted in THE

REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON,

1776-1826 (VOL. I), at 495, 501 (James Morton Smith, ed., 1995). Madison wrote later in the same
letter: "Even in its coolest state, [religion) has been much oftener a motive to oppression than a restraint
from it." Id. at 502. See also KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note I,at 103-06.
67. See MADISON, supra note 52, at 76 (Wednesday, June 6: "All civilized Societies would be
divided into different Sects, Factions, & interests, as they happened to consists of... disciples of this
religious Sect or that religious Sect"); THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961) ("A
zeal for different opinions concerning religion . .. [has] divided mankind into parties [and] inflamed
them with mutual animosity"). See also Marc M. Arkin, The Intractable Principle: David Hume, James
Madison, Religion. and the Tenth Federalist, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 148 (1995).
68. See HOLMES, supra note 2,at 49, 51-52, 60.
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rejected Enlightenment reason is to undermine everything that Madison
believed about the science of politics.
The evidence McConnell presents merely recreates, then, in a more
particular context, the general historical dispute over the meaning of the
religion clauses. Was the primary purpose of the clauses to protect the
church from the state or the state from the church?69 In light of the
strong evidence that the bulk of the Constitution-and indeed the framers
themselves-were products of the secular Enlightenment, McConnell's
history is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that the former was
the primary motivation. The mere support of religious believers for the
religion clauses is not dispositive: nonestablished religions-including the
evangelicals--might well have supported the religion clauses in order to
curtail the power of the established religions,7 ° which is not inconsistent
with the rationalist desire to create an entirely secular state.
McConnell also makes the somewhat different historical argument that
the founding generation was overwhelmingly religious, and therefore
would not have cast religion out of the public arena."' Steven Smith has
similarly suggested that "the founding generation was deeply and
pervasively influenced by Protestant thought and practice."72 It is not
necessary to dispute this conclusion in order to deny its significance.
First, the founding generation did not draw the same distinction between
faith and reason that we do. As Gordon Wood notes, most eighteenthcentury Americans believed that "[e]ven scriptural truth could be
supported by experience and reason, and few American ministers saw any
need to deny the Enlightenment for the sake of religion.,

73

Similarly,

another scholar suggests that Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom," and the federal religion clauses that followed it, taught "that
God seeks to extend religion not by force, or even by faith, but rather 'by

its influence on reason alone.' '7 4 Another views as descriptive of the

eighteenth century American philosophy Plutarch's saying-quoted with
approval by an American thinker-that "to follow God and obey Reason
is the same thing.",75 In 1784, Ethan Allen wrote that "[r]eason therefore

69. See Stephen Pepper, ConflictingParadigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty versus Equality, in
1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 7. 15-19; SMITH, supra note 5,at 157 & n.26.
70. See Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The
Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Centupv. 80 MINN. L. REV. 1047 (1996).
71. MCCONNELL. supra note 21, at 191.
72. SMITH, supra note 5. at 157.
73. WOOD, supra note 50, at 8. McConnell disputes this description of American religion,
suggesting that the "Lockean-Jeffersonian preference for rational over traditional religion" did not reflect
the beliefs of most Americans, who were in the throes of an evangelical religious revival. MCCONNELL.
supra note 45, at 1435-73 (quotation at 1450).
74. Sanford Kessler. Locke 'sInfluence on Jefferson's 'Billfor Establishing Religious Freedom, .25
J.CH. & ST. 231 (1983).
75. KETCHAM, supra note 50,at 13; see also RUTH H. BLOCH, VISIONARY REPUBLIC: MILLENNIAL
THEMES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1985); Ruth H. Bloch. Religion and Ideological Change in the
American Revolution, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE
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must be the standard, by which we determine the respective claims of
[religious] revelation. 76 In 1787, Thomas Jefferson advised his nephew
to "[q]uestion with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there
be one, he must 7more approve of the homage of reason than that of
blindfolded fear."0
In short, the framers (except for McConnell's evangelicals, whose
influence is hotly disputed) believed in a reasonable God. One authority
describes the framers as adhering to "a nondoctrinaire religious deism,"
which "rejected a supernatural faith built around an anthropomorphic God
who intervened in human affairs," positing instead "a God understood as
a supreme intelligence who after creating the world destined it to operate
forever after according to natural, rational, and scientific laws." " But
belief in a reasonable God will never create a conflict with the secular
state, for whatever can be demonstrated or decided by reference to religion
can as easily be justified based on human reason."' Where faith and
reason conflict-as they do in many contexts today-appeals to a
generation that saw them as complementary are of little use.
The historical appeal to our religious antecedents is troubling in another
way as well. As Mark Tushnet has sharply reminded us, to the extent the
framers were religious, they were exclusionary and inegalitarian:
The connection that the framers drew was not between republican virtue
and religion in general, or even between virtue and Christianity. It was
between virtue and Protestant Christianity. In this light their social
theory appears morally repugnant as well as wrong.... After all, most
of the framers believed that Catholics, adherents
to an authoritarian
80
religion, could not be good republican citizens.

1980S 44, 51 (Mark A. Noll ed., 1990); Harry S. Stout, Rhetoric and Reality in the Early Republic: The
Case of the Federalist Clergy. id. at 62, 65; UNDERKUFFLER-FREUND, supra note 60, at 896-901.
76. ETHAN ALLEN, REASON THE ONLY ORACLE OF MAN 475 (1784).
77. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (August 10, 1787), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 429, 431 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden. eds., 1944). Jefferson
may have been extreme in his reliance on reason, but there are indications that the founders in
general--like most Enlightenment thinkers-believed that any religious tenets that were contrary to
reason should be rejected. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 92-93
(1986); JOHN B. BURY, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT 105-06 (1913): Frederick Mark Gedicks,
The Religious. the Secular. and the Antithetical, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 113. 125 (1991); KRAMNICK &
MOORE, supra note I, at 101 (*It is worthwhile to note that Jefferson's views were by no means
fundamental departures from those of his fellow founding fathers").
78. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note I, at 34.
79. Indeed, belief in a reasonable God eventually eliminates the need for recourse to religion at
all--at least in the public arena-as God's truths are all accessible to human reason. As Jeffrey Stout
puts it, "[eighteenth century] Deism, in short, accepts only those tenets of traditional theology that can
be established independently as probable hypotheses." STOUT, supra note 33, at 117 (1981); see also
TURNER, supra note 64 (religious response to Enlightenment, by making God rational, eventually
spawned unbelief).
80. TUSHNET, supra note 35, at 228.
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The framers' general religiosity is not reflected in Justice Douglas'
comment that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being."8 ' Rather, it is epitomized by Justice Story's conclusion-in a case upholding a testator's establishment of a secular college-that "Christianity [is] a part of the common law of the state [in that]
its divine origin and truth are admitted",82 and that Judaism and Deism
are "form[s] of infidelity." 83 I doubt that even the most ardent originalists
want to rely on that kind of religious sentiment as the basis for their
interpretation of the religion clauses. And once we free ourselves from this
narrowest interpretation of the founders' views of religion, there is no
logical stopping point short of reincorporating their general Enlightenment
secularism with its preference for reason over faith.
III.

THE REASONS FOR REASON

Abandoning the Enlightenment by denying the primacy of reason is as
unwise as it is anti-originalist.84 Without reason and empiricism, we have
no way of mediating among the different claims of faith. Indeed, in this
age of post-modemism, not only religious believers claim to "know" truths
irreconcilable with rational scientific empiricism. Radical social
constructivists also reject reason in favor of other epistemologies.
Radical social constructivists argue that Enlightenment reason does not
exist apart from its social and political hegemony. Reason, they claim, is
socially constructed; it is neither more nor less than the epistemology of
those in power. Alternative epistemologies, while currently disfavored, are
equally sound. Thus the radical project is to expose "scientific rationality"
as just one among many ways of knowing, and to reject "linear, rationalistic thought" in favor of more personal, anecdotal, and intuitive
epistemologies. 85 Epistemological pluralism is the order of the day, and
policies and practices based on or justified by appeals to reason-from the

81. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
82. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 198 (1844).
83.

Id.

84. A more detailed version of my arguments in favor of the primacy of reason may be found in
Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep ofReason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453 (forthcoming February 1996).
85. See. e.g.. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
54 (1987); GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON: "MALE" AND "FEMALE" IN WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY (1984); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call ofStories. 79 CAL. L REV. 971, 976, 1028-44
(1991); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 359 (1987); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The
Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 893-94, 903
(1989); Linda R. Hirshman, Foreword: The Waning of the Middle Ages, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293,

297-98 (1993). Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19. 27 (1991); Gary
Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L.J. 758, 806; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo s Tenth Chronicle:
Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711, 1721 (1995).
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Socratic method to the protection of freedom of speech-are discriminatory against those who are epistemologically different.
A few academic defenders of religion explicitly take a similar approach.
Frederick Gedicks uses the language of social constructionism when he
describes "the allocation of creationism to the marginalized world of
subjectivity and evolution to the privileged world of objectivity" as
"merely the exercise of social power. 8 6 But even those who do not
explicitly endorse social constructivism are necessarily arguing in favor of
epistemological pluralism and against the primacy of reason. Douglas
Laycock, for example, would allow those with nonrational religious
beliefs-such as that one will be eternally damned if one works on the
Sabbath-to avoid obligations that are imposed on the rest of us. 87 Since
he presumably would not grant the same privilege to flat-earthers (an
exemption from overseas military assignments based on their fear of
falling off the edge?), racists (an exemption from anti-discrimination
laws?), or the insane (an exemption from any consequences for criminal
conduct?), he is necessarily according the epistemology of faith as much
respect as the epistemology of reason--and more respect than other
similarly nonrational epistemologies. Certainly, those who argue that
religious reasons and arguments are appropriate for public discourse and
public policy-making are epistemological pluralists.sp
What, then, is wrong with epistemological pluralism? Its primary failing
is that it leaves no way to resolve disputes between epistemologies except
by recourse to power. If we cannot reason together, then all we can do
is arbitrarily select winners and losers. The winners will necessarily be
those with power. If reason is not a universal epistemology that can
mediate between different belief systems, but only the particular belief
system favored by the powerful, then whoever is in power will reify his
own epistemology. That is the nature of the social constructivist critique.
And using power to impose epistemological truths is just what even the
pluralists themselves oppose: Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment
Division v. Smith9" was castigated for "leaving accommodation to the

86. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostilityto Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671,686 (1 992);
see also Michael J. Perry, Comment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1067, 1068 (1986) ("The liberal attempt
to disqualify religious judgments or beliefs is an attempt to privilege a particular conception or range
of conceptions of rationality, and thus liberalism is not at all as 'neutral' or 'impartial' as it aspires and
advertises itself to be").
87. LAYCOCK, supra note 17; see also MCCONNELL. supra note 19; MCCONNELL, supra note 6.
88. See sources cited in note 20, supra.
89. Stephen Holmes makes an analogous argument: "Nonentanglement is an essential precondition
for majoritarian politics in any multidenominational state." HOLMES, supra note 2, 58, at 225.
90. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For criticism, see MCCONNELL, supra note 19; LAYCOCK. supra note 17.
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political process," 9' but leaving epistemological disputes to the political
process is exactly what the abandonment of reason leads to. 92
The problem with rejecting the Enlightenment in favor of
epistemological pluralism is deeper than that it disappoints many of its
adherents by legitimating Justice Scalia's position in Smith. If we cannot
confidently assert that the earth is round or that evolution occurred,
because those with a different epistemology present a counterargument that
is valid in their world even if not in ours, the same is true of other
scientific or historical statements. Historian Deborah Lipstadt has noted the

connection between epistemological pluralism--specifically in its
93
postmodemist form-and the flourishing of Holocaust denial theories.
There is indeed no principled way to distinguish those who maintain that
the Holocaust never occurred from those who maintain that God frowns
on homosexuality or that Jesus Christ was His Son. None of these claims
is supported by reason, but only by faith; only the faithful concur.
Ordinary standards of evidence and rationality are abandoned in the name

of faith, and no amount of evidence will convince the faithful that they are
wrong.'
The question then becomes whether the government is either permitted
or required to grant alternative epistemologies the same respect that it
accords Enlightenment rationality. In other contexts, we draw several
careful distinctions that have been ignored in the context of religion:
government may not prohibit beliefs, but it can circumscribe actions based
on those beliefs and it can refuse to lend government support to those
beliefs. The government can penalize a racist who acts on his certainty
(despite the absence of any credible evidence) that blacks are inferior, and

91. 494 U.S. at 890.
92. Of course, another possibility is to privilege the epistemology of faith. Most committed religious
believers in fact do so, believing that they possess the one universal and objective truth. This position
is not available to those advocating particular constitutional or legal doctrines, since if the Establishment
Clause means anything, it means that the government cannot act as if it accepts the objective truth of
particular religious beliefs.
93. DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND
MEMORY I (1993).

94. Two arguments against my analogy might be made, but both should be rejected. First, it might
be argued that there is persuasive evidence that the Holocaust occurred (contrary to the claims of the
faithful deniers) while there is no firm evidence against the divinity of Christ. But the difference
between believing in something that is refuted by ordinary standards of evidence, and believing in
something that is implausible and unsupported by ordinary standards of evidence, is only a matter of
degree, and not of kind. Even if a claim cannot be "proven" false, if it would ordinarily be rejected in
the absence of faith, it is not rational. Ordinary canons of rationality mitigate against the miraculous.
A second line of argument that proves fruitless is to suggest that supporters of some
claims--especially Holocaust deniers and "creation scientists"-make pseudo-rational arguments and
thus are not functioning under different epistemological standards. The point of privileging the
Enlightenment, however, isto allow us to reject such arguments as unpersuasive in our epistemological
context. Unless we are willing to agree with the radical social constructivists that all such judgments
are mere social constructs, adopting an epistemology of reason allows us to dismiss some claims as
unwarranted. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?
83 CALIF. L. REv. 853 (1995).
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a university can refuse to teach--or to subsidize a group preaching-that
the earth is flat. There is no reason to think that the combination of the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses mandate any different treatment
for nonrational beliefs derived from religion. Indeed, the thrust of this
Article is that the Constitution itself-including the religion clauses--privileges rational over irrational epistemologies.
IV.

A REASONABLE CONSTITUTION

If the underlying epistemology of the Constitution is rationality, what
does that mean for interpretation of the religion clauses? It means that the
government must treat religious beliefs the same way it does other
nonrational beliefs (absent a compelling interest to the contrary), and that
it may adopt rationally justifiable policies that conflict with beliefs derived
from alternative epistemologies. While the government presumably may
not take a stance on the substantive truth or falsity of any particular
beliefs, it can deem some beliefs more justifiable or more warranted
because of their epistemological derivation. However, this epistemological
privilege can be bestowed only on rationalism, and not on any nonrational
epistemology.
In combination, these principles suggest that government may not make
decisions that are themselves based on contested religious beliefs that
cannot be rationally supported, that privilege religious over secular beliefs,
or that single out religious beliefs from among other nonrational beliefs for
preferential treatment. In each of these instances, the government is
treating religious epistemology as superior to other epistemologies,
including rationalism. This in turn implies that the government is more
convinced of the substantive "truth" of some nonrational epistemologies
than of others.
This does not mean, of course, that we should prohibit any nonrational
beliefs. Moreover, as noted earlier, a rational polity might have secular
reasons for protecting religious beliefs in particular. Nonetheless, in
interpreting whatever religious protections a rational polity might be led
to adopt, we must remember that rationality underlies both the polity itself
and its decision to protect religious liberty. In other words, our Enlightenment Constitution protects religious liberty because doing so is rationally
justifiable, not because religion itself is rational or in any sense "true."
Any other interpretation ultimately treats matters of religious belief as
sacred or at least equivalent to beliefs founded on human reason and
experience. And for a government to treat religion in that way is to
formulate policy on the basis of reasons accessible only to those who
subscribe to the beliefs at issue, which is ultimately a matter of faith rather
than reason.
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Thus to the extent that protecting religion cannot be rationally justified,
it should not be protected. Rational justifications, of course, include the
argument that departing from general protection of religion-even in
instances where it might not be rational in the abstract to protect a
particular type of religious practice or belief-is unfair or otherwise
detrimental. Thus very broad protection of religion can be justified even
in a polity committed in general to the principle that government decisions
must be made based on reasons accessible to all.
Another way of putting this is to suggest that the government itself may
not engage in epistemological pluralism, although it must tolerate such
pluralism and may ultimately conclude that subsidizing or otherwise
encouraging such pluralism is good policy. Nor may it engage in
epistemological preferentialism except to the extent that it prefers the
Constitution's own rationalist epistemology.
Both the older line of accommodation cases and the newer questions
raised in Rosenberger implicate questions of epistemological
preferentialism. For the government to single out religious believers for
special protection-as when it grants exemptions for religious but not
secular conscientious objectors-is to privilege religious beliefs over both
secular beliefs and the needs of the secular government. There is no
objective difference between claims of eternal damnation and other
objections to legally required conduct, and a law that grants exemptions
only to religious objectors grants more credence to religious claims,
necessarily privileging its underlying epistemology. Thus the Court in
Smith was correct to reject the Yoder line of cases, and, indeed, should
have gone so far as to prohibit the legislature from granting special
privileges to religious objectors alone absent a compelling governmental
interest.
Rosenbergerraises somewhat more difficult questions. A factual inquiry
might resolve the case easily: did (or would) the University of Virginia
fund student publications dedicated to denying the Holocaust or justifying
white supremacy? If not, then funding the religious publication singles out
religiously derived nonrational epistemologies" for preferential treatment
and is thus at least optional and perhaps prohibited. 9 In deciding not to
fund any of these alternative epistemologies, the government is essentially
determining that it will fund only those publications that conform to its
95.

That the religious organization challenging the University's policy both derived its beliefs from

a nonrational epistemology and intended to proselytize its faith is apparent from the publication itself.
The publication is "A Christian Perspective," designed to "challenge" students to live according to
"faith." 115 S.Ct. at 2515. Each issue urges readers to adopt beliefs on the basis of faith, not reason.

Id. at 2534 (Justice Souter, dissenting).
96. Whether it is prohibited turns on two factors beyond the scope of this paper. First, we would
have to decide under what circumstances the Establishment Clause should be interpreted to prohibit any
government expenditure on behalf of religion. Assuming that the subsidy was not automatically
prohibited, the University would still have to justify, in secular terms, preferring religious beliefs over

other nonrational beliefs.
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own rationalist epistemology. As I have suggested above, this course is
perfectly consistent with both historical and practical interpretations of the
Constitution. It is also consistent with the doctrines that the Court has
developed for dealing with government subsidization of speech generally.
The Court has essentially suggested that government subsidies may
discriminate on the basis of the content of the speech if the unsubsidized
speech interferes with or is antithetical to the purposes for which the
subsidy is provided. 97 A university that chooses not to fund any nonrational epistemologies can argue that its educational mission-and its purpose
in subsidizing student publications-is to foster rational thought rather
than irrationality, and that funding publications that propound irrational
beliefs is antithetical to this purpose."
The more difficult situation arises if the University did (or would) fund
other nonrational publications. Here the issue is whether the religion
clauses either permit or require the government to single out religion,
among other nonrational epistemologies, for disadvantageous treatment
when it is spending public monies. The theory propounded in this paper
would suggest that the government may not do so without a compelling
reason, for the same reasons that it may not single out nonreligious
alternative epistemologies for unfavorable treatment. To deprive religious
publications, but not analogously irrational publications, of funding would
be to make the funding decision not on the basis of epistemology but on
the basis of underlying truth or falsity. Just as accommodating religious
but not racist conscientious objectors would be according more respect to
religious beliefs than to racist beliefs, subsidizing racist but not religious
publications would be according more respect to racist beliefs. It is one
thing for the government to distinguish between rational and irrational
beliefs, but it is quite another for the government to deem some irrational
beliefs truer or more worthy of respect. Thus, the government may choose
not to subsidize or accommodate or otherwise benefit any nonrational

97. For illustration of this principle, see, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (speech about
abortion not consistent with purposes of Title X program, and could therefore be prohibited to
participants in program); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 261 (1988) (schoolfunded publication may censor material as long as censorship is "reasonable related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns"); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (public employee's speech did not
interfere with functioning of her office, and therefore could not be penalized). See generally Luba L.
Shur, Content-Based Distinctions in a University Funding System and the Irrelevance of the
Establishment Clause: Putting Wide Awake To Rest, 81 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1712-20 (1995).

98. It is possible to question the whole doctrine, and to suggest that the University would have been
required to fund all student publications if it funded any. For example, content-based discrimination is
prohibited in the context of a public forum: just as the government may not prohibit speech it does not
like in a public forum, it may not prohibit religious speech in a public forum. It might be possible to
suggest that the University's subsidy program was the equivalent of a public forum. But if the
University is required to fund other nonrational publications (for this or any other reason), then the
issues are the same as if it voluntarily chose to fund some nonrational publications but not religious
publications, discussed in text immediately following this footnote.
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epistemologies, but it may not pick and choose among them without a
compelling reason. 99
CONCLUSION

I have argued that the government may not single out any irrational
beliefs for preferential treatment, nor is it required to treat alternative
epistemologies as favorably as Enlightenment rationality. Both history and
practical considerations support the notion that the Constitution rejects
epistemological pluralism in favor of the primacy of reason. There is no
evidence that the religion clauses are an exception to this basic principle;
indeed, for the founding generation, pre-Enlightenment religion was the
primary-and perhaps the only--example of a nonrational epistemology.
If we allow government decisions to be made on the basis of, or
influenced by, premises and conclusions that fly in the face of the
Enlightenment's rationalist and empiricist methodology, we must accord
the same consideration to Holocaust deniers--and to racists, flat-earthers,
and other peculiar or dangerous believers-as we do to religious believers.
To do otherwise is for the government to accept as true the claims of
particular religious believers--a course of action that is dangerous to
government and religion alike, and is therefore wisely rejected by the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses.

99. See SHUR. supra note 97, for a contrary argument, suggesting that as long as the university
discriminates only on the basis of subject matter and not on the basis of viewpoint it may allocate its
funds as it sees fit.
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